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1. Introduction: the phenomenon of IPOs 
          
 
Although  it may not be obvious at first sight, the processes  of democratisation do take place in the 
contemporary world. From the mediaeval  period  onwards, the governed are  gaining  ever  more 
power  against the governors. These processes, however, have not been  limited  only to states - 
they  include  the  international community  as a whole.  In terms of states' democratisation,  the 
most  important milestone was an introduction of  parliamentarism in continental Europe. One  of 
the  most  significant proofs to show  that  democratisation  n the international community has 
extended to the international level as well, was an establishment of international parliamentary organs 
(IPOs). The era of IPOs began in 1949, when the Consultative Assembly in the framework  of  the 
Council of Europe was created.1          
 
In  the  last 50 years,  numerous IPOs were established  or  were meant to be established (see Table 1). 
Their institutional  position  and role differ with regard to the degree of  supranational characteristics 
an international organisation possesses. Basically, we make a distinction between two kinds of IPOs; 
the IPOs  of intergovernmental organisations; and the IPOs  of  international organisations  where 
supranational qualities  prevail  (hereafter referred  to as supranational2 organisation). The role of an 
IPO depends  on the type of international organisation of which  part it  is.  In an 
intergovernmental  organisation,  the  supervisory  role  is  entrusted  to national parliaments 
(e.g.  by  means  of ratification  of  decisions  made by such  an organisation).  If created in such a 
framework, IPOs are usually meant to be  ancillary to  the  methods of supervision, 
carried  out  by  national parliaments of member states. However, the more an  international 
organisation  becomes supranational, the less possible it is  for national  parliaments to supervise it. 
Thus, more powers  are  or should be provided for an IPO of supranational organisation to exercise 






Name         Year of       Constitutional 
     Establishment           Basis3   
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe  1949  YES 
Common Assembly of the ECSC  1952  YES 
The Assembly of WEU  1954  YES 
Consultative Assembly of the Balkan Alliance  1955  YES4 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the  
Interparliamentary Consultative Council  
of the Benelux Economic Union  1955  YES 
The North Atlantic Assembly   1955  NO 
The European Parliament   1957  YES 
The Nordic Council  1962  YES 
Permanent Committee of the Members of  
the Committee of Members of Parliament of 
EFTA Countries  1962  NO 
The Legislative Council of the Central American 
States 1962  YES 
The Legislative Assembly of the East 
African Community  1967  YES 
The Andean Parliament   1979  YES The Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE  1990  NO 
The Pan African Parliament  1991  YES 
The Joint Parliamentary Committee of the EEA   1992  YES      
 
Table 1: International Parliamentary Organs   
 
 
The most remarkable example to demonstrate the viability of  IPOs in  a 'supranational' organisation is 
provided with the  case  of the  European  Parliament. Given the institutional  setting,  in which  it has 
developed, and the scope of its  powers, the European Parliament can hardly be compared with any 
other IPO.  Moreover, due to the specific supranational  environment in which it has been established, 
it may appear that the Parliament's  scope of action is limited only to the European Union. Such an 
impression,  we  argue, is wrong. As the result of the progress in integration  among member states of 
the European Union the scope of the Parliament's powers was increasing.  
Bearing this in mind, it seems safe to assume that  the European Parliament 
undoubtedly  influences  other IPOs.  The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe  provides  a  case  to elaborate this argument. The attempts of the Parliamentary Assembly  to 
change  the  existing inter-institutional  relations  within the Council of Europe, are influenced by  the 
'ideology' and particularly by the achievements  of  the European  Parliament. On the other 
hand,  however, the Parliament  faces difficulties in exercising its  role  even within the European 
Union. In order to overcome  such  difficulties, the Parliament may have to co-operate with an IPO that 
comes from  another, intergovernmental setting. 
 
The Assembly of Western European Union (hereafter referred to as 'WEU Assembly') should 
specifically be mentioned in this respect. It seems that at least at the present stage,  democratisation  of 
one  of the 'pillars' of the European Union, the  Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) could 
depend more on the WEU  Assembly than on  the European Parliament. 
 
The aforementioned assumptions are going to be explored on  three tracks. Firstly, a brief historical 
analysis of the  influence of democratisation processes in the European Communities/European 
Union  on the strivings of the Parliamentary Assembly for a more active  role in the framework of the 
Council of Europe is going to be introduced. The  attempts  of the Parliamentary Assembly have 
always been  defeated, but this may not necessarily remain so, especially if the process of 
democratisation of the European Union is carried out  successfully.    
          
Secondly,  a short study of the present role of the WEU  Assembly within  the European Union is 
going to be introduced. At present it  may  be premature to evaluate co-operation among member states 
in  the field of CFSP. It may nevertheless be argued that the role of the WEU Assembly could be 
significant in the process of democratisation of the CFSP  and may compensate for the 'absence'  of  
the European Parliament from this 'pillar'. 
 
Thirdly, some issues that  may determine the role of the European Parliament in the European 
democratisation processes, need to be discussed. In this respect, we are going  to  focus on the main 
source of  inter-institutional  conflicts - the intergovernmental foundations  of  the European Union. 
        
In  this  paper, we deliberately avoid an  analysis  of  existing formal  and informal links  between the 
European  Parliament  and other  IPOs,  especially with the Parliamentary Assembly  of  the 
Council  of Europe; nor do we analyse the scope of powers of  respective IPOs in greater detail. We 
are aware, however, that such an  analysis would substantially contribute to a more  comprehensive 
study as the one that is being offered here. Yet this would require a lot more space available.  
 
 
2. The influence of democratisation processes in the European Union on the tendencies of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of  the Council of Europe to increase its own scope of powers 
2.1. The foundations of influence 
          Article  22 of the Statute of the Council of Europe  defines  the Parliamentary Assembly as the 
deliberative organ of the organisation, entitled to debate matters within its competence under  the 
Statute.  The Assembly presents its conclusions, in the form  of recommendations,  to the Committee 
of Ministers, an  intergovernmental organ of the Council of Europe. The Assembly also discusses  and 
makes recommendations upon any matter referred to  it  by the Committee of Ministers with a request 
for its opinion (Article 23  of the Statute). However, the Assembly cannot adopt  decisions  that would 
be binding on the Committee of Ministers or  on member states.  As  to the  inter-
institutional  relations,  the Parliamentary  Assembly is rather feeble in relation to 
the  Committee  of  Ministers. The only commitment of  the Committee  of Ministers  towards  the 
Assembly is to consider  further  actions according  to the Assembly's recommendations (Article 
15  of  the Statute),  and to prepare a report of its work for each  session  of the Assembly (Article 19 
of the Statute). Last but not least, the Parliamentary Assembly does not have any significant powers 
in  the budgetary field; it is merely consulted on the amount  of funds allocated for its purposes (Article 
38/d of the Statute). 
 
 
2.1.1.  'European authority with limited functions but real powers' 
     
The  struggle  of the Parliamentary Assembly for an  increase  of its institutional weight has continued 
ever since its very  first session.  In  many cases, the Assembly's proposals with such an aim were 
directly inspired, on the one hand by the logic that was behind the successes  in the integration process 
within the  European Communities (European  Union), and on the other hand by the increase of powers 
of the  European Parliament. Having realised that the Council of Europe was  meant to  be  an 
organisation without specific  powers  towards member states, with an assembly functioning as a 
debate club, the  first representatives of the Parliamentary (Consultative) Assembly  did not wait to 
propose reforms, aiming at a more powerful organisation.  These first proposals had a common 
denominator, which  was embodied in the concept of creating a 'European  authority  with limited 
functions but real powers'.6    However, the proposals met no  success in the Committee of Ministers. 
          
The idea of creating a 'European authority with limited functions but  real powers' was obviously 
influenced by the  clash  between federalist and functionalist visions of a future European  order. 
The  compromise  it had offered, however,  was  unacceptable for member states which did not think 
of  transferring  intergovernmental co-operation  in the Council of Europe to  a  'higher' level.   The 
claim of the Parliamentary Assembly for more  powers would  probably have stopped at this point, if J. 
Monnet had  not suggested a completely new logic of integration that was brought into life by 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community  (ECSC) in 1951. 
          
 
2.1.2. 'Specialised authorities' 
 
The  Parliamentary Assembly quickly comprehended the gist of  the ECSC. Even before the 
inauguration of the  ECSC, the Assembly proposed that 'specialised authorities' ( i.e. authorities, 
similar to  the one for coal and steel), should be established in other fields as well - but within the 
framework of the Council of Europe.7 The  essence of the whole idea was the 
following:  once  'specialised  authorities'  had been created, it would be necessary  to make provisions 
for their political control. It could be the task of  the Council of Europe (and consequently of 
the  Parliamentary Assembly) to exercise such a control.  
          
The  Committee of Ministers expressed its willingness to  endorse the  concept  of specialised 
authorities. In May  1951,  it  even adopted  a  statutory  text  on 
'specialised  authorities'  (Parliamentary Assembly, Doc.18(1951),para.4). The text  provided for a 
legal basis  for  the Council  of Europe or its member states to take an initiative  in setting up 
'specialised authorities' and lay down principles  for bringing them into a relationship with the Council 
of Europe.  In practice,  however, no such 'specialised authority' has been  set up in the framework of 
the Council of Europe.  
          There  seemed to be some important political reasons  that  prevented the concept of 'specialised 
authorities' to be  implemented.  Some argue, for instance, that the reason why the ECSC 
was  established outside  the Council of Europe's institutional framework was because member  states 
of the ECSC "were no longer ready to wait for the slowest  ship in the convoy of the Council 
of  Europe"  (Fischer, 1990:70). In other words, since the Six felt there was too much opposition in the 
Council of Europe to further integration among member states, they thought it would not be useful  to 
have such authorities within this organisation.  
          
So, the initial  efforts  of  the Parliamentary Assembly to increase the strength of the Council of Europe 
did not meet the desired goals. It became clear,  however, that with the defeat of classic federalist 
projects in the  1940s and the absence of other alternative ideas, only practical  experiences of the 
ECSC Common Assembly (which later evolved into the European  Parliament), could  provide source 
from which the Parliamentary  Assembly  can develop proposals to increase  its  own powers. 
Interestingly  enough,  a new set of  proposals  of  the Parliamentary Assembly for revision of the 
Statute coincided with the end of  the period 1986-1993; the period in which the powers of the 
European Parliament substantially increased. 
 
 
2.2.  The Parliamentary Assembly's proposal on a revision of  the Statute of the Council of Europe 
          
At  its 32nd sitting on 11 May 1993, the  Parliamentary  Assembly adopted  the Recommendation 1212 
on the adoption  of  a  revised statute of the Council of Europe. This recommendation  was the most 
comprehensive and  the  most ambitious project the Parliamentary Assembly has ever undertaken.        
 
We  do  not wish to go into details of Recommendation 1212. It  should be noted, however, 
that  according  to this proposal, the scope of the  Assembly's powers would substantially increase. The 
Assembly would be  given de iure right of assent in many fields: admission of new  members (Article 
4); associate membership (Article 5); observer status of the  states  interested  in the work of  the 
Council  of  Europe (Article  6); observer status of  non-governmental  organisations (Article 8);  
suspension or expulsion of a member state  (Article 13);  suspension of the right of representation of a 
member state in  the Committee of Ministers and in the Parliamentary  Assembly (Article 14); 
establishment of specialised institutions,  including advisory and technical committees (Article 23); the 
rules  of operation  of  the Chamber of  Local  and  Regional  Authorities (Article  46); and 
amendments to the Statute (Article  52).  Furthermore,  arrangements  on institutional and  working 
relations with the European Community (Article 7), as well as draft conventions, agreements and 
protocols (Article 35) would be subject  to Parliamentary Assembly's approval. According to the 
proposal of a Revised  Statute,  the Assembly still  remains the  deliberative organ of the Council of 
Europe (Article 28), but it would have  a right of initiative in respect of conventions (Article 35).  
          
Some of the proposals laid down in Recommendation 1212 reflect de facto changes that have already 
taken place (e.g. the  Assembly's assent,  requested  by  the Ministers prior to  their  voting  on 
admission of  new member states). Generally speaking, however, the institutional  position of the 
Assembly, especially its right  of  assent, would have substantially improved, had the member 
states  ratified  such a proposal.  
 
The  reactions on Recommendation 1212 were moderate. In  the  final statement of the Vienna Summit 
(9 October 1993), the Committee of Ministers was requested to consider necessary statutory  reforms, 
taking into consideration the Assembly's proposals.8  No statutory changes that would follow the 
Assembly's proposal  from 1993 have been agreed so far. It is hard to predict whether  this proposal 
would result in statutory changes in the near future. We would  argue, however, that the possibilities 
for an increase  of the Assembly's powers depend on the course of development of the European 
Parliament's position in the European Union.  It is dificult to imagine that the Parliamentary 
Assembly  would have  wasted time and energy into such a proposal, had the  powers of  the European 
Parliament not been increased to such an  extent in such a short time. Although in different context, 
democratisation in one institutional setting must be followed by  democratisation  in   another  one. If  democratisation within  the European Union continues, it would be ever more difficult for the 
member states of the Council of Europe not to react on this development.    
 
 
3. The European Parliament and the WEU Assembly  in the European Union: Partners or Competitors? 
 
 
3.1.  The institutional position of the European  Parliament  and the WEU Assembly in the field of 
CFSP 
 
According  to  the  provisions on  common  foreign  and  security policy (CFSP) as laid down in the 
Treaty on European Union,  the Western  European Union (WEU) has become an integral part of  the 
development of the Union. Its task is to elaborate and  implement decisions  or actions of the Union 
that have  defence  implications (Article J(4/2) of the Treaty). The role of the WEU is  to provide a 
platform for the decision-making process in the  framework  of  the European Union in security 
matters.   
 
A detailed discussion on  the  Treaty provisions  which relate to the CFSP will be avoided here. It 
should  be  emphasised, however,  that  the CFSP represents a particular  'pillar' in  the 
Treaty  on  European Union in so far as  co-operation  in  its framework  is intergovernmental. 
Consequently, the European  Parliament is not involved in the CFSP decision-making to the extent 
it  would have wished. Furthermore, the Treaty provisions on  the CFSP never specifically refer to the 
WEU Assembly.    
 
Taking into account that, a:) at present the European Parliament plays a  relatively modest role in the 
decision-making  process  within the  CFSP; b) that the WEU (with its  Assembly)  is to provide a 
platform for making decisions in the  field of security, one may ask the question what is the rationale 
of installing the WEU Assembly in within the CFSP?  
 
Various  answers can be given to this question. In 1989, R.  Seidelmann  wrote about the democratic 
deficit in the  international organisations  dealing  with defence and security issues.  It  is 
true,  Seidelmann continues, that national parliaments have  certain powers in the field of security 
policy. Yet these powers are relatively  limited, in particular when compared with  the scope  of 
parliamentary powers in other areas of national  decision-making. Moreover,  such a  parliamentary 
control may not be enough. Due to the ever greater  interdependence  between  states, defence and 
security issues  tend  to  be discussed  at  the  international, rather than  at the  national level.  Thus, a 
certain parliamentary supervision should  be  extended to international organisations which deal with 
defence and security  issues. According to Seidelmann, neither  the  WEU Assembly nor the NATO 
Assembly,  due  to  their institutional position and the scope of powers, do not seem to be in a position 
to exercise such a supervision (Seidelmann,1989:76-77). 
          
The  situation  regarding   parliamentary  supervision  over  the defence and security issues, as 
described by Seidelmann, has  not changed much to these days. Neither was the entry of the WEU into 
the European Union followed-up by changes with respect to the institutional  position  of the WEU 
Assembly.  The  WEU  has so far remained essentially intact; its organisation and 
institutional  structure have  not been subject to any adjustments. Radical  changes in  this respect are 
probably not needed as long as co-operation in the framework of the CFSP remains intergovernmental. 
It may even be assumed that as long as the CFSP remains a separate pillar, no significant changes will 
take place within the WEU.  
 
3.2.  Integration  in the field of CFSP and the role of  the  two IPOs 
 
Although  the  possibility of some changes in  the  institutional framework  of  the CFSP is 
anticipated,9  it is  hard  to  predict which  course  changes could take. Yet if one  agrees  that  with 
further integration among member states in the field of CFSP, the 
existing  parliamentary  control  may  become  insufficient,  the question arises  which of the two IPOs can assume this task? Taking into account the nature of co-operation in the framework of the CFSP, it 
is difficult to expect that the European Parliament can  get more powers in the field of security and 
defence in  the near future. As long as  co-operation in the CFSP  does  not 
assume  a  supranational  character, it is not  likely  that  the European  Parliament  will  get any 
significant  powers  in  this field.  The only IPO which could, at least  temporarily,  provide for  a 
democratic supervision within the CFSP, is the WEU  Assembly. 
          
It will be recalled that the European Parliament has been  active in  the  security field since 1978, when 
it adopted  the  Klepsch Report  on  arms  procurement (Jorgensen,1990:145).  Considering itself the 
only assembly created by a treaty, which is  empowered  to discuss security questions, the WEU 
Assembly  has  never been  happy with such activities of the European  Parliament.  At the WEU 
Assembly's session in June 1989, the British  representative to the Assembly, Lord Finsberg, accused 
the European Parliament  of interference with the work of the WEU Assembly (Jorgensen,  1990:145). 
Negative feelings of representatives of the  WEU Assembly towards the European Parliament grew 
stronger when  the negotiations  on the Treaty on European Union began. It  appeared to them that the 
Parliament's strategy was first to take over the Assembly's  responsibilities in the defence and 
security  fields, and then ultimately annex it.10 
 
To what extent may such fears be justified? As long as  the CFSP co-operation remains 
intergovernmental, there  seems to be  a room  for  the WEU Assembly to play a role 
within  the  European Union.  Clearly the European Parliament can call for a reduction of the 
democratic deficit only in the areas that are the  responsibility  of the three Communities. This cannot 
be the case,  nor can  it  be  effective, in areas that are a matter  for  member states'  prerogatives  and 
decisions, as is the case  of  defence (WEU Assembly,Doc.1308,para.134). Only the 
national  parliaments of those countries, and only the IPO of the organisation,  competent  for  defence 
issues in the European Union, can  exercise  a democratic supervision over the governments of 
member states.   
          
Of  course,  there is always a third possibility, i.e.  that  the CFSP  falls within the competence of 
supranational  institutions. In such a case there would obviously be no need for two  separate IPOs  in 
the European Union. However, one should not exclude the possibility  that  the  CFSP remains 
within  the  member  states' purview  for  a longer period. If this assumption  proves  true, 
then  certainly  the WEU and its Assembly have a  future  in  the European  Union. In this respect, it is 
quite easy to imagine  a bicameral type of parliamentary supervision. The European Parliament would 
be to supervise the European executive in areas within its  purview. Intergovernmental co-operation 
would be  supervised  by  the WEU Assembly. There are also  some  considerations about having a  
dual parliamentary supervision, which would give to each of  the two assemblies  the right to express 
a  qualified opinion   on the matters within the purview of  the  other  (WEU 
Assembly,Doc.1308,para.139).  
 
In any event, some parliamentary control over intergovernmental co-operation within the framework of 
the European Union  will have  to  be provided. But this should not be the  same  type  of  
parliamentary control as in the case of a classic intergovernmental  organisation.  The CFSP and WEU 
are placed  within  and  not outside  the European Union, which means that member states  will tend  to 
deepen the integration also in fields such  as  security 
and  defence.  Consequently,  intergovernmental  co-operation within the CFSP will follow the 
level  of integration, accomplished among member states  in  the economic  field.  Clearly the process 
of adjustment will  not  go fast.  It is true, however, that the less intergovernmental  co-
operation  within  the CFSP will be, the more  will  crucial defence  and  security issues be discussed 
at  the international level. It  should  be the task of the WEU  Assembly  (until  the European 
Parliament's powers are adequately extended to the CFSP)  to  provide  for a parliamentary supervision 
in this  field.  The less the WEU Assembly is able to exercise such a supervision, the higher  will the 
democratic deficit in the framework of the CFSP be.  
 
Therefore, the WEU Assembly cannot appear as an adversary to  the European Parliament -  or  vice 
versa. Rather, it  seems  that there will  be enough work for both the WEU Assembly and  the  European Parliament to secure a parliamentary supervision in within the CFSP,  no matter the 
future development in this field. 
 
 




The  present  paper  has indicated some aspects  of  influence a progress  in extending the powers of 
the European Parliament  may have  on other European IPOs, such as the Parliamentary  Assembly of 
the Council of Europe. It has also been shown that the Parliament  may  enter  a relationship with an 
IPO which comes from a different, intergovernmental setting, in order to provide  a parliamentary 
supervision (if not control) of all  the components  of the European Union. 
 
Clearly, the aforementioned conclusions are but small details  to support  the  argument that the 
European Parliament is  the  most important driving force in the process of democratisation of  the 
European  Union  and  beyond. However, the extent  to  which the Parliament will continue to remain 
the most important part of the democratisation process greatly depends on the  future  institutional 
development in the European Union.     
 
Clearly it is premature to give a comprehensive assessment of the new developments concerning the 
European Parliament. The Treaty on European Union came into force only in  November 1993. A new 
intergovernmental conference is anticipated in  1996. We may argue, though, that the new reforms of 
the European Communities  (European  Union) did not bring the Parliament much closer to its  own 
basic aim - to become  a genuine legislative organ. Indeed,  there is one important difference between 
reforms that have taken place before Maastricht and the present Treaty on European Union, which 
gives the Parliament more hope for a fulfilment of its aim.  For the  first time in their history, member 
states of  the  European Communities  (European Union) managed to sign and ratify  provisions, 
aiming at creating a political union. By taking this step, member states  have come even more closer to 
the  eternal dilemma of the integration process as a whole - is there a point in  this process at which 
member  states will ultimately draw the line? 
 
An answer to this question might come even sooner than one  would have expected it. There are 
certain issues, which members of  the European  Union  simply have to solve, if they do  not  want  the 
whole  project  to become questionable. Perhaps one of the  most pressing  issues  is the decision-
making process.  The  procedure under Article 189(b) is the latest proof in demonstration  of  the 
fact  that the present mixture of governmental and  supranational characteristics  of the Union becomes 
unbearable. It seems to  us that   there is  not  much space  left for member states in the present 
institutional structure of the European Union to manoeuvre between  a supranational hammer and 
an  intergovernmental  anvil.  
 
Taking into account that the European Communities (European Union) have been subject to 
numerous  changes in the last ten years, and that consequently member states may not be willing to 
keep  up  such  a speed  of  reforms in the near future, it can be assumed that  new changes  may not 
see the light of the day  very soon.  In the long term, however, member states of  the  European Union 
do not have much of a choice: either  integration or disintegration.  Sooner  or  later member states will 
have to proceed with more substantial  reforms of  the present decision-making process. It 
cannot  be  predicted what course the new reforms will take. It is, however, difficult to imagine any 
higher form of organisation of the European  Union without an important role for the European 
Parliament in it.   Clearly it is not in the interest of the European Union  to  lose its  transparency, or to 
appear difficult to understand to the citizens. In this respect, it will, inter alia, have to be decided to 
what extent the  present mixture of supranational and  intergovernmental  characteristics still  serves its 
purpose. An answer to these and many other dilemmas we have not even touched upon,  will 
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